Despite the robustness of complex networks has been extensively studied in the last decade, there still lacks a unifying framework able to embrace all the proposed metrics. In the literature there are two open issues related to this gap: (a) how to dimension several metrics to allow their summation and (b) how to weight each of the metrics. In this work we propose a solution for the two aforementioned problems by defining the R*-value and introducing the concept of robustness surface (V). The rationale of our proposal is to make use of Principal Component Analysis (PCA). We firstly adjust to 1 the initial robustness of a network. Secondly, we find the most informative robustness metric under a specific failure scenario. Then, we repeat the process for several percentage of failures and different realizations of the failure process. Lastly, we join these values to form the robustness surface, which allows the visual assessment of network robustness variability. Results show that a network presents different robustness surfaces (i.e., dissimilar shapes) depending on the failure scenario and the set of metrics. In addition, the robustness surface allows the robustness of different networks to be compared.
1. How to unify the dimensionality of each robustness metric of vector t in order to legitimate their summation. 2. How to define the weight of each metric to optimally extract the most significant information.
In this work we propose a solution for the two aforementioned problems by defining the R*-value and introducing the concept of robustness surface (V). The former extracts the most informative robustness metric for a failure scenario, while the latter allows network robustness variations of different networks to be visually assessed, regardless of the failure scenario.
Results
R*-value. The rationale of our proposal is to make use of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (see Methods). Given a set of robustness metrics t, we first define the initial robustness as follows:
where t 0 is the set of metrics when no failures occur, andv is a normalized eigenvector or Principal Component (PC). We obtain v from the procedure that computes the robustness surface (see following subsection and Eq. 4). The fact thatv is normalized makes R Ã init equal to 1. Additionally, R* can be computed when p% of elements fail as denoted next: The difference between R* and R (Eq. 1) is that in our proposal the principal componentv gives dimension and non-arbitrary weights to each of the metrics. In addition, besides finding the most informative robustness metric, we adjust the initial robustness to 1, thus simplifying the comparison of network robustness variations when failures occur.
Robustness surface (V). The robustness surface allows the network performance variability for a given failure scenario to be visually assessed.
In fact, V is a matrix where the rows are the percentage of failures (P) and the columns are the distinct failure configurations (m). The list of percentage of failures P (e.g., P 5 {1%, 2%..100%}) denotes the range of failures for which the robustness is evaluated. A failure configuration represents a realization of the failure process. The different failure configurations m depict the different subsets of elements that fail for a given percentage of failures, with each subset being distinct from one another. The robustness value in V[p][i], where p g {1%..jPj%} and i g {1..m}, is given by R Ã p (Eq. 3). To obtain the robustness surface of a network given a failure scenario (e.g., node and random), we define the following procedure:
1. Let A p be an m 3 n matrix where p g {1%..jPj%} is the percentage of failure. The goal is to transform A p into a smaller data set, i.e., a vector v p of size m, while preserving the most significant information. Therefore, we define v p as a vector of size m 3 1. v p contains the set of m values R Ã p computed when p% of elements fail. 2. To do so, we first compute the covariance matrix C p of each matrix A p . Then, we average the jPj covariance matrices to obtain a unique matrix C. This allows us to obtain a PC independent of p. 3. We calculate the eigenvectors V and the eigenvalues D of C. At this point, the l most relevant eigenvectors of V are taken as the principal components for each matrix A p (see Methods for further details). Hereafter we assume that l 5 1, i.e., v is the eigenvector PC. 4. Then, we obtainv by normalizing v:
5.
By multiplying the principal componentv by each row of A p we obtain a vector v p of size m. Each value of v p is, indeed, R Ã p . Next, by iterating this procedure for all matrices A p , we obtain a set of jPj vectors v p . Finally, we define v' p as a vector v p sorted in decreasing order. Consequently, the robustness surface is given by the following expression V~v' 1% , . . . ,v' jPj% È É .
Although different failure scenarios (e.g, link random and link by betweenness centrality) provide differentv, each of them satisfies Eq. 2 becausev is normalized (as shown in Eq. 4).
Case study. Here, we illustrate the suitability of our proposal for evaluating the robustness when considering several metrics. To do so, we study two real critical infrastructures: the Spanish railway network (sprailway) 21 and the European power grid network (europg) 22 .
We consider incremental and irreversible random and targeted attacks (e.g., betweenness centrality (BC) or node degree). Link and node failures are considered for the sprailway and europg, respectively, to show that the robustness surface allows us to compare network robustness independently from the failure scenario. Link failures are caused randomly and by link BC, whereas node failures are caused randomly, by node degree, the clustering coefficient and node BC. In both cases, jPj is set to 70, i.e., from 1% to 70% of failures. The presented results are obtained for 500 and 100 runs (m) for random and targeted attacks, respectively. For each of the runs, a different realization of the failure process is considered, i.e., a distinct subset of elements that fail according to the failure scenario.
We consider the following metrics: the largest connected component (LCC), the degree of fragmentation as a function of the number of connected components (only applicable to link failures), the average nodal degree, the two-terminal reliability, the average clustering coefficient, the average shortest-path length, the diameter, the average node BC, the average link BC and the algebraic connectivity. Therefore, link failures have n 5 10 while node failures have n 5 9. Table 2 presents the main characteristics of the two networks considered. Although both networks have a different number of nodes and links, they show a similar average node degree AEkae, which is between 2 and 3. However, europg has a higher node maximum degree, what means that such a network is more vulnerable to targeted attacks. The average shortest-path length AElae depicts that europg is about two times wider than sprailway. Finally, both networks have a negative value of assortativity (r), which means that nodes of dissimilar degrees are connected to each other.
Numerical results. The results of our work are presented in Figures 1  and 2 . The x-axes show the different failure configurations for which the n metrics have been computed. The y-axes depict the range of percentage of failures (from 1% to 70%). At each coordinate (x,y), i.e., for each percentage of failures and for each subset of elements that fail, the R Ã p -value is shown. In each figure the range of colors expresses variability, with dark blue and dark red being the two extremes of each failure scenario intervals. Since R Ã init~1 , i.e., the initial robustness is set to 1 regardless of the set of n chosen metrics, our results allow a visual assessment of the robustness variation with respect to the initial conditions. The further the value of R Ã p is with respect to R Ã init , the lower the performance of the network is. When R Ã p is close to 0, the performance is considered to be totally deteriorated. Moreover, it is possible to observe R Ã p~1 when p $ 1%, and the LCC of the network has similar properties to the initial network (without failures). Figure 1 presents the robustness surface V of sprailway in the case of random (a) and link BC failures (b). Interestingly, the random case provides a smooth surface, while the targeted case presents abrupt slopes. The latter is worth noting, because the presence of abrupt slopes in the robustness surface means that there are network elements (in this case, links) that could be protected in order to improve the overall network robustness.
In the case of europg, Fig. 2 depicts four robustness surfaces under different node failure scenarios. Similar to sprailway, the random surface in Fig. 2a depicts a regular behavior. In addition, the targeted-based cases depict rough surfaces. While Figs. 2b and 2c depict that europg is not robust under node degree or node BC failure scenarios, Fig. 2d shows that the network keeps the initial robustness until more than 30% of the nodes have failed. This implies that europg is significantly more robust under failures by the clustering coefficient than by other targeted strategies.
For some failure configurations, it is worth noting that R Ã p might increase at some percentage of failures with respect to R Ã init , as observed in 10% or 20% of failures in Fig. 1a and in 20% or 30% in Fig. 2a , as well as in the targeted-based surfaces. This result should not be misleading because it totally depends on the set of metrics that are being considered for the study. For instance, while some metrics might decrease as the percentage of failures increases, others might alternate increments and decrements because they depend on the number and size of largest connected components (i.e., average shortest-path length, diameter, algebraic connectivity, etc.). Therefore, the suitability of the robustness surface remains intact, because the variability of the robustness can be assessed in any case.
Finally, to compare the robustness surfaces of both networks, and considering the different failure scenarios, we average the values of each v' p of V. Thus, for each network and failure scenario, we obtain jPj R Ã p -values. Fig. 3 depicts a summary of the results. Fig. 3a shows the curves of R Ã p of both networks from 1% to 70% of failures. To complement the results in Fig. 3a , the variance is presented in Fig. 3b . For instance, it can be observed that both random failure scenarios show similar behaviors, although for europg the top of the curve is around 24% of failures. Therefore, our approach allows us to com- pare different networks, regardless of the failure scenarios. This comparison could be done numerically, for instance, by comparing the areas below the curves.
Discussion
In this work we present the R*-value and the concept of robustness surface (V). The rationale of our proposal is to make use of Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The R*-value solves two open issues in the robustness of complex networks field. Our proposal extracts the most significant information from a set of robustness metrics. R* is the first generic metric able to characterize the robustness of complex networks with a single value, while taking into account several robustness metrics.
The robustness surface V provides a framework to visually assess the network robustness variability. Moreover, it allows for the comparison of the robustness between different networks under distinct failure scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first method of its kind to allow the visual evaluation of the network robustness for a specific failure scenario, while at the same time considering several robustness metrics.
Robustness surfaces are designed as a visual monitoring tool. First, our approach is applicable to real-time monitoring of a network through a single value, when it is otherwise implemented according to multiplicity of correlated metrics with possible inherent redundancy. Second, V can be a pivotal part of a network robustness refinement process:
Step 1: If the robustness surface presents abrupt slopes, then there are network elements (nodes or links) which are weaker than the rest, for a given failure scenario. These elements could be identified by means of traditional robustness metrics such as the betweenness centrality. Step 2: Enhance or protect the weak elements, for instance, by adding new links or applying immunization techniques.
Step 3: Re-evaluate the robustness of a network and, instead of comparing a large number of robustness metrics, detect through visual inspection if the network robustness has been improved.
We believe that the contributions presented in this work will lay a firm foundation for future research on the robustness of complex networks. To conclude, the R*-value shows that there is no single and universal robustness metric for a network. Instead, the robustness varies according to the failure scenario and the metrics that are used to quantify the performance of the network.
For future work, we plan to study the stability of the robustness surfaces with respect to network size scaling.
Methods
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA is a powerful tool to identify the most significant information in a data table representing observations described by several dependent variables, which can be inherently correlated. The goals of the PCA are to: (a) extract the main information of a data set and express it by means of new orthogonal variables called principal components; and (b) compress the size of the data set while preserving the most important information 23 .
Let A be a data set of m observations of a vector-valued variable, i.e., A g R m3n . We define C as the covariance matrix of A, which is denoted by:
where i, j g {1..n}, and cov col Ai ,col Aj À Á is the covariance function evaluating column i and column j.
PCA works with the spectrum of C. Let v i g R n31 {i g 1..n} and l i g R be the eigenvectors and corresponding eigenvalues of the covariance matrix C, respectively. The matrix V with all v i as columns represents the principal components, and provides an orthogonal transformation to the PC space. Furthermore, we denote D as a matrix with the eigenvalues in its diagonal.
LetṼ be n 3 l matrix, which only contains the top l of the most important principal components (see Methods: Most relevant principal components of A for further details). Therefore, we can obtain the transformed data v~AṼ.
In our problem, each failure has a covariance matrix C p , where p is the percentage of failure. We perform the PCA on C~C p dp, in order to obtain the PC independent of p.
Most relevant principal components of A. In order to choose the l most relevant principal components, matrices V (eigenvectors) and D (eigenvalues) must be column-sorted in decreasing order, according to the eigenvalues in the diagonal of D. The importance of each eigenvector is characterized by its energy quantum g. The eigenvalues represent the distribution of the energy of A among each of the eigenvectors. The energy quantum for the j th eigenvector is the sum of the energy quantum across all eigenvalues from 1 to j:
LetṼ be an n 3 l, where l # n matrix that contains the most relevant eigenvectors. Then, the objective is to choose an l value as low as possible while preserving a reasonable high value of g on a percentage basis. For instance, we have chosen l so that g is above a certain threshold a:
min l [ 1::n ½ :
In this work we have considered a 5 0.9, from which we have obtained l 5 1.
Simulation details. The computation of each metric has been done with PHISON 24 . The simulations were performed on a Linux system with a 16-core 64bit Intel Xeon processor of 2 Ghz and 64 GB of RAM. The presented results are the average of 500 and 100 differently seeded simulation runs for random and targeted failures, respectively. The figures have been plotted by means of the pcolor function of MATLAB. In addition, the PCA has also been done with MATLAB. 
